

St. Bonaventure, *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, Book II, Distinction 38, Article 1
(Quarrachi II:883–87)

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Question 2: What is that end that by its goodness makes the will good, and to what ought our wills be referred in order that they be upright?

It is asked, second, what is that end that by its goodness makes the will good, and to what ought our wills be referred in order that they be upright? And it seems that such an end is charity:

Fundamenta

1. “The end of the commandment is charity.” (1 Tim 1) But wills are to be referred to that end to which the commandments are referred. If, therefore, charity is the end of the commandment, charity is the end of a good will.
2. Again: “He who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law.” (Rom 13) And again: “Love is the fullness of the law.” But wills are to be referred to that in which consists the fullness and fulfillment of the law. If, therefore, charity and love are such, it is clear that, etc.
3. Again, this seems true by reason. Every good will is ordered to man enjoying (*fruatur*) God and having God. But we do not enjoy God nor have Him except through charity. Therefore to have charity is nothing other than to have God. If, therefore, every good will is ordered to having God then it seems that the end of every good will is charity itself.
4. Again, nature in its operation intends as end the form that perfects it in natural being (*in esse naturae*). Therefore the will in operating principally intends a form perfective in moral being (*in esse moris*). But the form or habit perfective of the will in moral being is charity itself. Therefore charity is the principal end of every good will.

Sed contra

1. “The end of the law is Christ.” (Rom 10) But the end of the law and of the good will are the same. Therefore it seems that Christ is the principal end of the good will, and therefore not charity.
2. Again, Bernard in his book *On Loving God* says “From love (*amore*) one comes to charity (*charity*), and from charity one comes to wisdom.” Therefore wisdom is more excellent than charity. But that which is most excellent ought to be set down as the end of a good will. Therefore the end of a good will is not charity but wisdom.
3. Again, the end is that which is to be enjoyed (*fruendum est*). But charity is not to be enjoyed because only the uncreated good is to be enjoyed. Therefore it seems that charity is not the principal end of a good will. *If you say* that the end of a good will is not created charity but uncreated charity, *on the contrary* the Apostle says “The end of the commandment is charity” proceeding “from a pure heart” etc. But charity proceeding from a pure heart and faith unfeigned is nothing other than created charity. Therefore, etc.
4. Again, the end of a good will is that which [once] had the will seeks nothing further. But when charity is had the will still seeks something further, namely God Himself. Indeed, to the extent that someone has greater charity, to that extent does he seek [Him] more. Therefore it seems that charity does not have the character [*rationem*] of an end.

5. Again, “what weight is in bodies, that is love in spirits.” [Augustine] But weight in bodies is not said to be the end of locomotion in any way. Therefore love in spirits will not be said to be the end of rational appetite, and therefore not of the will either.

6. Again, the end and the beginning (*principium*) are distinct. But charity is the root of every good affection. If therefore the end comes after that which is a means to the end, and charity is the root, it seems that it ought in no way be said to be the end of a good will.

Conclusion: Charity is the end of every good will.

I respond: It is to be said that the Master [Peter Lombard, the author of the *Sentences*] speaks rightly in assigning charity the end of every good will. For in this he has followed the teaching of the Apostle and of blessed Augustine. For the Apostle expressly says that “charity is the fulfillment of the commandment” and “the fullness of the law.” Augustine also says in the *Enchiridion* that “All the divine commandments are referred to charity.” And in the book *On Christian Doctrine* he shows that all of Scripture is ordered to commending the commandment of charity. And so charity is not only the end of the good will but also of the whole of sacred Scripture and of pious knowledge. Even though God, or happiness, or Christ can be said to be the end of the good will, nevertheless the Master preferred to say that charity is the end because the complete character [*ratio*] of serving as end belongs to charity itself. For since “end” is said in three ways—namely the “end in which” one rests and the “end by which” one rests, and the latter is said in two ways, either “simply” or “as currently”—charity is the end of the good will in every one of these ways. For uncreated charity, which is God—concerning which it is said in the first canonical [epistle] of John “God is charity”—is the end in which one rests. Created and consummate charity, on the other hand, namely the charity of heaven, is the end by which one rests in God simply speaking. Inchoate charity, however, namely the charity of the wayfarer, is the end by which one rests in God as currently. For just as the [body] in place does not rest in its place except by means of weight the soul does not come to rest in God Who is its place and ultimate end except by means of love (*dilectione*), to which it belongs to consider the good in its character as good (*sub ratione boni*). The good in its character as good contains simultaneously the character of end and of that which is lovable. And therefore the intention of the end is attributed most of all to charity. The arguments, therefore, that show this [*the fundamenta*] are to be conceded.

Reply to Objections

1. To the objection that Christ is the end of the commandment it is to be said that this does not exclude charity from being the end. For even if Christ is the end in which one rests, nevertheless charity can be the end by which we rest in Christ. Again, charity, according as it is the end in which we rest, corresponds to the whole Trinity. And therefore these two things can both stand: that Christ is the end of the law and charity as well.

2. To the objection that from charity one arrives at wisdom, and therefore wisdom is more excellent, it is to be said that the way that Bernard speaks there about wisdom it does not name another gift than charity but a new state of the same gift in such a way that charity commonly understood is distinguished from charity named by appropriation. According as charity is described commonly it contains love (*amorem*) and wisdom. And in this way it is assigned as the end of the commandment.

3. To the objection that the end is that which is to be enjoyed (*fruendum est*) it is to be said that according as “end” is said in two ways, namely that by which one rests and that in which one rests, in the same way “to enjoy something” (*frui aliquo*) is said in two ways, either as object or as something dispositive. And in both ways we enjoy charity. For we enjoy the charity which is God as object. We

enjoy the charity which is a habit as something dispositive. And in this way it is clear that that [objection] does not stand in the way of what has been proposed.

4. To the objection that the will rests when it has its end it is to be said that that is true when it has its end completely. However, even if charity is had during this life (*in via*) it is nevertheless not had completely. “For there is a fire in Zion and a furnace in Jerusalem.” [Is 31:9] When, however, it will be had in heaven nothing further will be sought due to the fact that through [that charity] the uncreated good will be had, in which consists the end and rest of all our desires.

5. To the objection that weight in bodies is not the end of motion it is to be said that this is not similar because weight is found in bodies both in the absence of the due place and in its presence. Charity, however, is never in the soul unless God is present. Whence everyone who has charity has God. And for that reason when our every act is ordered to having God it is ordered to having charity. It is not this way in the case of weight because not every body having weight has its due place.

6. To the objection that the end and the beginning are diverse some people respond that charity is the beginning and the end in different ways. For it is the principle of the good work according to inchoate being and its end according to complete and perfect being. For anyone acts well so that the love of God and charity may increase. Another and more probable response is that just as mode, species, and order are grounded in the same reality and yet “mode” names a comparison to the efficient cause, “species” a comparison to the exemplar cause, and “order” names a comparison to an end, in the same way charity can have both the character of an efficient cause and of the end with respect to the good work according to different comparisons. For charity connects our will to God Himself as to a moving principle; and it conforms [it to Him] as to a directing rule; and it unites [it to Him] as to an end that brings it to rest. And therefore just as God Himself has the character of an efficient cause insofar as He moves and of a formal cause insofar as He directs and of a final cause insofar as He brings to rest, in the same way also charity itself has the character of that threefold cause with respect to the [human] work. Nor is this unfitting because according to the Philosopher three kinds of causes can coincide in one. [*Physics* II.7] And in this way it is clear that even if charity is the principle [or beginning, *principium*] of the good work, nevertheless it can be its end according to different comparisons. And this makes the response clear to the final question why charity is called the root and the form of the virtues and the end. For this is said according to different comparisons of our will to the divine will. It is also called in addition the “bond of perfection” [Col 3:14] in comparison to neighbors, who are joined to us by the bond of charity.

Question 3: Does the good will have only one end or can there be many?

The third question is whether there is only one end of a good will or can there be many. And it seems that there is only one.

Fundamenta:

1. Deuteronomy 6: “You shall love the Lord your God etc.” The Gloss [on this verse says]: “God does not want His love to be divided in such a way that we love something else together with Him.” Therefore whoever establishes for himself different ends does not do what God wills. And if he does not do what God wills he does not have a good will.
2. Again, on the passage from Philippians 1 “either through pretext or through a good will,” the Gloss says “Whoever seeks from God something other than God does not love chastely.” But no will is good except that which loves Him chastely. Therefore no will is good that seeks something other than God.
3. Again, just as [the regress of causes] stops in the first principle, so too does [the regress of ends stop] in the ultimate end (*sicut status est in primo principio, ita in fine ultimo*). But the first principle in which [the regress] ends is unique. Therefore, if the end ought to correspond to the principle, it seems

that only one end ought to be set for the good will. Therefore if the will sets for itself many ends, it does not do what it ought. Therefore it is not good.

4. Again, whoever intends different ends has his heart divided. But he who divides his heart does not love God from his whole heart nor does he seek God in his whole heart. And whoever is like this does not please God who commands that He be loved by the whole heart and wills to possess the whole heart. Therefore it does not seem that the will can be good that sets for itself different ends.

Sed contra:

1. On the [verse] of 1 Cor 9 “Since he who plows ought to do so in hope” etc. the Gloss says “The preacher who opens hearts to faith ought to plow in hope of temporal contributions.” It seems therefore that the good will can set for itself not only a spiritual end but also a temporal one. It seems therefore that it can have different ends.

2. Again, Luke 15: “How many hired hands in my Father’s house . . .” On this passage Ambrose says that “Many are hired hands, who abound in hope, faith, and charity.” But a hired hand sets for himself a created end, namely some reward, which is created happiness. For if he set for himself only the uncreated end he would no longer be a hired hand but a son. Therefore, if it happens that there are good hired hands, then it happens that a good will has different ends.

3. Again, a good added to a good makes a greater good. Therefore if one good end makes the will good, much more do many good ends. Therefore it seems that to the extent it sets for itself many good ends to that extent the will is better. Therefore it is not necessary that a good will have only one end.

4. Again, just as the concupiscible [appetite] desires sweetness the irascible [appetite] desires greatness and the rational [appetite] desires beauty. If, therefore, beauty is not only the end of the rational [appetite] but also [its] perfection, and similarly for the other [appetites], and [if] the perfections of many perfectibles are [themselves] many, then since there are three different powers in us by which we are turned upwards, namely, the rational, concupiscible, and irascible, it seems that one is to assign multiple different ends in every good action and will.

Conclusion: There is only one principal end of a good will, under which there can be other non-principal ends.

I respond: It is to be said that there is only one principal end of the good will. On this account it is to be understood that setting many ends [for oneself] can happen in three ways: in one way such that [one] end is under [another] end and for the sake of the [other] end; in another way such that one is the principal end and the other not principal while yet the non-principal end is not actually referred to the principal one; in a third way such that each is a principal end. An example of this can be taken from that which frequently happens, namely, when someone goes to church to obtain distributions [of money.] [Note: the context seems to indicate that there was a practice in the middle ages, at least in certain places, of handing out money to people who came to Church.] For one can do this in three ways: either in such a way that he principally intends the honor and glory of God when he goes there to sing [God’s] praises [or lauds] and at the same time with this he intends to obtain money that he may distribute it to the poor or to turn it to other licit uses for the honor of God. In another way someone can go to Church intending to please God and at the same time as this to acquire money yet in such a way that he does not refer its acquisition to God, while nevertheless he does not set the money itself as his principal end insofar as he does not love it for its own sake. In a third way someone goes to church with a twofold intention, in such a way that he will to please God and will to obtain the money which he desires to acquire in the way an avaricious man does so that he can increase his treasure and delight in it for its own sake.

To set different ends [for oneself] in the first way is good and meritorious and pertains to the good will. To set different ends [for oneself] in the second way does not belong to the good will formally speaking, nevertheless it is not repugnant to it in such a way that it cannot coexist with it. For there is only a venial sin there, not a mortal one. And this is what Augustine wants to say in his book *The Confessions* when he says “He loves You less who loves anything together with You that he does not love for Your sake.” (Conf. X) To set different ends [for oneself] in the third way does not belong to the good will but is rather contrary to the good will. For such a person wills “to serve two masters” and this is impossible, as is said in Matthew 6. For when in this way he intends two ends principally, the word of the prophet is verified: “The blanket is constricted in such a way that one falls out, and the small mantle cannot cover both.” And such is the will of the hypocrites whom Scripture threatens with the woe of eternal damnation because “they go about the earth in two ways.” And therefore it is said in Ecclesiasticus 1: “Approach Him not with a twofold heart,” for he who approaches “with one heart and another” is a hypocrite. And because “the joy of a hypocrite resembles a point,” therefore it is said in Hosea 10: “Their heart is divided; now they will perish.”

In this way therefore it is gathered from what has been said that there can be many ends of a good will in such a way that one is the principal end and the other non-principal, or is an end under another end. To set up many principal ends, however, is repugnant to a good will as the reasons advanced on the first side [the fundamenta] show. For since only one is the highest and true good that brings to rest human desire, it is necessary that the good will set for itself a single end if it is to be righteous.

Reply to objections:

1. Therefore to the first objection to the contrary, that he who plows ought to plow in hope, it is to be said that the Gloss itself dissolves that objection when it makes itself clear in what follows. For the force of the statement is in the words “in hope” rather than “for the sake of hope.” For “for the sake of” indicates a principal end, “in” however not only indicates a principal end but rather an end that is contained beneath [another] end. And therefore from that saying it does not follow that someone can set for himself many principal ends. Rather the opposite follows if it is rightly understood.
2. To the objection that a hired hand sets for himself a created end it is to be said that there is a good hired hand and a bad one and a bad hired hand differs in two ways from a good one. First, indeed, because a bad hired hand sets for himself a created end which can be had without having God, whereas a good hired hand sets for himself a created end to have which is not other than to have God, as is [the end of] the very enjoyment [*fruitionem*] of God. Secondly, however, the bad hired hand differs in that he sets for himself a created end as principal end, whereas a good hired hand sets for himself a created end as an end under [another] end. For he does not love God for the sake of enjoyment [*fruitionem*] but enjoyment for the sake of God. And therefore it does not follow from this that the end of a good will is made many.
3. To the objection that a good added to a good makes a greater good, it is to be said that that is true when the addition of good to good occurs with the preservation of [due] order. For since goodness necessarily supposes order, if the addition of good to good takes away [due] order it will not increase the good but rather destroy it. Since therefore a plurality of principal ends does not preserve order—because according to right order there ought to be a stand in one thing and the ultimate ought to be unique—therefore a plurality of principal ends does not increase the goodness of the will but rather depraves the will itself because when it will to please one, it displeases the other and when it wills to attain one, it loses the other.
4. To the objection that the rational [appetite] desires its own beauty and the concupiscible [appetite desires] sweetness and so forth, it is to be said that beauty and sweetness can be taken in two ways,

either as perfective of and informing a power of the soul, or as motive of the soul itself. In the first sense it has the character of an end under an end and in this way it can be multiplied according to the diversity of the gifts of the soul. In the second sense, namely as it has the character of an object and motive, it has unity. For in God beauty, greatness, and sweetness are the same. And in this way it has the character of a principal end. And in this way it is clear that although one happens to set up many non-principal ends, nevertheless for the will to be good it is necessary that only one end be principal. For otherwise God is not loved with whole heart.