Agustin Echavarria, in a recently published article in Theologica, defends classical theism from Joseph Schmid’s providential collapse objection (here and here.) He begins by commenting on my Thomistic response article (here and here). I appreciate his taking the time to read my work and for his respectful interaction with it. After an accurate presentation of the earlier parts of my paper, he has the following to say:
“Shields’ proposal is certainly suggestive. Moreover, if successful, it would end at the same time with both the problem of intentional collapse and the problem of providential collapse. One might even argue that it has more textual evidence in its favor in Aquinas’s texts than Shields himself provides. [He helpfully cites ST I q. 19 a. 2 ad 5; SCG I c. 79 n. 8; and SCG I c. 82 n. 12.] However, I have some doubts about whether this is the best way to approach the problem of providential collapse in particular. Mainly because this proposal seems to be contrary to what Tomaszewski calls the “modal indiscernibility thesis” (MIT). MIT is the idea that “if the doctrine of divine simplicity is true, then God in any possible world is really, intrinsically indiscernible from God in any other possible world” (Tomaszewski 2023, 238). To say that there are contingent relations in God established by His will implies that God establishes these relations of reason in some possible worlds and does not establish them in others; therefore, His will is not identical in every possible world with regard to these relations, which is contrary to MIT.” (Echavarria, p. 71)
The mentioned texts are certainly very helpful and I’m grateful that Echavarria points them out. In my paper, however, I maintain that “The one necessary act that [God] is identical with can contingently relate itself to the dog Fido as willing to create or as not willing to create, without any difference or contingency in God’s act.” (Shields, p. 86) “The act need not be different in itself to relate itself differently to creatures, as I have shown above.” (Shields, p. 87) “God does not need to be any different to have different relations to the same possible creature. . . . God’s one essence, with no difference in the act with which his essence is identical, can relate in different ways to possible creatures.” (Shields, p. 90)
I don’t think that my position violates Tomaszewski’s “Modal Indiscernability Thesis,” although I suppose that depends on precisely what Tomaszewski meant by it. But I claim that neither God nor His will (which are identical) would be any different intrinsically if He related differently to creatures, willing to create some that He has not in fact willed to create, and not willing to create some that He has in fact willed to create.
Echavarria seems to find this implausible; he has the following to say:
“This conclusion [that the Modal Indiscernability Thesis would be violated] is not avoided by saying, as Shields holds, that relations are not accidents or absolute ontological items in God, and so they are not intrinsic properties. As Shields himself admits, God’s contingent relations are different “ways” in which God’s will is determined with respect to certain possible creatures. Moreover, since they are relations “of reason,” their only possible ground must be in God’s will (rational appetite) itself, and not in something extrinsic to it. Hence, the existence of these relations implies by itself an intrinsic determination in God’s will, because they imply the intentional and intrinsic direction of the will toward certain possible creatures in particular, instead of others. Being contingent relations, this intrinsic determination of God’s will obtains in some possible worlds and not in others. Therefore, the very existence of these relations implies that the divine will is not intrinsically identical in every possible world.” (p. 71-72, emphasis added.)
I think that the italicized premise of the argument here is incorrect, and I gave an argument against it in my paper, p. 84-87. In the case of libertarian free-will, on pain of infinite regress, there has to be a first difference caused by the will, prior to which there is no other difference at all. A free will is such that without being any different intrinsically it can immediately produce different alternative effects. In God’s case, this very first difference is the relationship between His will and the possible creature. There need be no difference within God’s will causally prior to His relating differently to creatures, nor need any difference within God’s will accompany the difference in His relationship to creatures. As for intentionality, it is itself relational. God’s intentionality of creating this creature and not creating that creature just is the relation between Him and the creature. Echavarria did not choose to saying anything in response to this part of my argument, but in fairness to him his real target was Schmid and he spent the majority of his article developing his own response to Schmid.
Echavarria’s own response raises concerns for me. He makes some helpful points in response to Schmid, in particular that he overreached in claiming that the set of God’s possible effects would be utterly without restriction on the doctrine of divine simplicity. But Echevarria seems to deny God’s total, immediate, and particular providence. St. Thomas certainly thinks that God has such total, particular, and detailed providential control over everything in the universe. (See, for example, ST I, q. 22, a. 2 & 3; q. 23, a. 4.) I am worried that Echevarria’s defense of classical theism is not very classical. However, he indicates that the question of intentionality and intentional collapse is crucial here, and that he deals with God’s intentionality in a forthcoming article. It’s possible that this will clarify his position in such a way that it preserves the particular divine providence essential to classical theism. I am interested to see what he has to say in any case.