The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion has accepted for publication my paper “Getting Lost with the Mentaculus: Linford, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and Cosmological Arguments.” I respond to Daniel Linford’s criticisms of the use of big bang cosmology and thermodynamics in theistic cosmological arguments. Linford argues that either the direction of time and causality is reducible and the universe can “begin” without a cause, or the direction of time and causality are non-reducible and the universe need have no beginning. He appeals to the “Mentaculus” account (associated with David Albert and Barry Loewer) of the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics to support his view of reducible time and causality. I argue that not only does Linford mischaracterize proponents of cosmological arguments, but the classical version of the Mentaculus fails to justify a reducible view of time and entropy increase. The past hypothesis together with time-symmetrical dynamical laws cannot explain the parallel direction of entropy increase experienced by isolated branch systems. Time must have a fundamental arrow and entropy increase is fundamentally asymmetrical in time. The second law of thermodynamics has a “statistically absolute” character connected with irreversible, objective collapse of the quantum wave function. Linford’s naturalistic bounce cosmologies are excluded on the grounds that their extended entropy reducing phases violate the second law. I further critique the role that speculative models of physical cosmology have played in debates over theistic arguments and respond to two common objections against appeals to entropy by proponents of cosmological arguments.